Eskimo North


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          Outage...


          • To: irc@dragondata.com, outages-list@eskimo.com, eskimo-announce@eskimo.com
          • Subject: Outage...
          • From: Robert Dinse <nanook@eskimo.com>
          • Date: Wed, 27 Oct 1999 19:00:03 -0700 (PDT)
          • Resent-Date: Wed, 27 Oct 1999 19:33:35 -0700
          • Resent-From: eskimo-announce@eskimo.com
          • Resent-Message-ID: <"xguoG.0.-A.-Nx5u"@mx1>
          • Resent-Sender: eskimo-announce-request@eskimo.com

          
               The outage from about 3pm-6pm PST was caused by a packet flood that is
          absolutely the most vicious I've ever seen.
          
               It was a UDP flood which had a forged source address that was random in
          the range of class C's from 192.x.x.x to 224.x.x.x, the destination address was
          random within our address space, the source port was random, the destination
          port was 53 (DNS), and the length of the packet was random, so there was
          absolutely no attribute one could filter on without ruining name service. 
          
               The attack lasted in excess of three hours, and strangely it stopped the
          very instant tickets were generated by Sprint.
          
               The volume of the attack was not sufficient to overwhelm our T1's but it
          seemed to make everything unreachable even by IP, and that remained the case
          even after the attack and was restored by rebooting the router.  I have never
          before had this router lock up, crash, or die, and in fact it wasn't locked up
          then it just stopped routing traffic. 
          
               And then to add insult to injury, when I did boot for some reason the
          damned router reverted to old data.  I have no idea why or how it did this. 
          
               So for eskimo customers, that's why nothing was talking from about
          3pm-6pm, and for IRC users, that's why services and irc.eskimo.com were
          unavailable during that time frame. 
          
               If someone out there, an ISP, might be willing to consider providing
          secondary DNS for our domains (about 1000 zones), so that we can get some DNS
          redundancy to provide some protection from this sort of thing I would be
          interested in talking to you.
          
          

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