The explosion of capable used fiberglass boats was a powerful structural headwind. Catalina’s own success from the 1970s–1990s flooded the market with durable, still‑sailable hulls—C‑22s, 27s, 30s, 34s—that can be refit for a fraction of the cost of a new build. The decision to move upmarket with the 5 Series and powerboats certainly raised Catalina’s exposure to macro economic shocks, but it was a plausible strategic response to Beneteau’s dominance at the entry level, not the core “mistake.” The collapse happened when fragile financing met a historically tough market—and when a storied brand no longer had Frank Butler’s conservative, cash‑focused stewardship guarding the downside. Primary, immediate responsibility lies with the 2025 acquirer (Reardon/Daedalus) for under‑capitalized consolidation, unpaid obligations, and the loss of the Largo plant that made continued production impossible.